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Workplace characteristics and working class vote for the old and new right 
This article focuses on the role of plant size for working class vote. We argue that workplace 
size does matter for political behaviour. Workers in smaller plants are less unionised and 
therefore base their voting decisions more strongly on their cultural attitudes, which 
undermines the support for social democratic parties. Using data from the European Social 
Survey (2002-2010), we find that workers in small plants have more right-wing attitudes and, 
consequently, vote for new and old right parties, contrarily to workers in larger plants. Our 
research points towards important structural explanations of working class support for the 
right and its cross-national differences. 
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1. Introduction 
The working class basis of radical right parties in Western Europe has been established in 
several studies over the last years (e.g. Carter 2005; Kitschelt 2007; Oesch 2008; Rydgren 
2013). This phenomenon has been particularly puzzling since the working class has been 
traditionally viewed as social democracy’s core clientele (e.g. Bartolini 2000). Moreover, 
several mainstream bourgeois parties have recently tried to broaden their voter base by 
working class votes. For instance, the Swedish Conservatives recently campaigned as 
‘Sweden’s New Labour Party’ (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008: 68). The Danish Liberals have 
outperformed the Social Democrats in recent elections among working class voters (Stubager 
and Hansen 2013). Nevertheless, few studies have systematically analysed the competition 
between new right, old right and social democratic parties for working class votes (Arzheimer 
2013; van der Brug et al. 2013).1 
 This article brings back a classical explanation on why workers turn right: plant size.2 
The link between workplace size, the development of working class consciousness and 
political behaviour had been first particularly prominent in the Marxist tradition: Since large 
workplaces make the development of class consciousness easier, workers in larger plants 
should therefore display higher level of support for left-wing parties (for a critical review of 
this argument, see Pontusson, 1995). More generally, large plants have been considered as a 
fertile ground for unionisation. According to Oesch (2006: 172), “the size of the workplace in 
which people are employed is one of the most commonly cited factors affecting union 
membership”. 
 These arguments are especially relevant for the overrepresentation of workers among 
the new right’s electorate (e.g. Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 2007; Rydgren 2013) in a context 
of the decline of large manufacturing factories and de-unionisation. Outlining some electoral 
consequences of deindustrialisation, Pontusson (1995) showed that the employment share of 
large plants was positively correlated with social democratic parties’ vote share. Accordingly, 
the decreasing share of large manufacturing plants and the restructuring of the economy 
towards smaller production units have become a structural disadvantage for social democratic 
parties.  
 Despite being often recognised as an important element for working class 
mobilisation, few studies have empirically tested the effect of plant size at the individual level 
(see the discussion by Pontusson 1995). Our article fills this gap and further explores the 
microfoundations of the plant size effect by looking at union coverage, workplace 
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antagonisms, and political attitudes as mediators. Plant size is closely linked to unionisation: it 
is an important predictor of it. We focus primarily on plant size since it is antecedent to 
unionisation. By additionally analysing unionisation as a mediating variable, we get a better 
picture of the respective impact of both variables.  
In a nutshell, we argue first that in small-sized workplaces, there is less antagonism 
between employer and employees than in larger ones. Similarly, workers in smaller plants are 
typically less unionised and more sceptical towards trade unions compared to their colleagues 
in larger plants (e.g. Bryson and Gomez 2005; Goss 1988; Oesch 2006: 172; Pontusson 
1995). This then hampers the development of common economic interests among the workers 
in smaller plants and strengthens the effects of authoritarianism and scepticism towards 
immigration. It is postulated that unions would have a causal effect in muting anti-
immigration attitudes (Lipset 1981). These effects finally foster right-wing vote choice among 
labour in smaller plants to the disadvantage of social democratic parties who fare better in 
larger unionised plants. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. We first review the literature and develop our theoretical 
arguments and hypotheses. The next section presents the data and the methods used. Our 
analysis afterwards proceeds in two steps. On the basis of the European Social Survey (2002-
2010), we first examine the effect of workplace size on political attitudes, and then on vote 
choice, in 16 European countries. We first find that employees and workers in smaller 
workplaces are more economically right-wing, as well as more authoritarian and restrictive on 
immigration. These effects are explained by fewer employer-employee antagonisms and 
lower union coverage at smaller workplaces. Second, we show that employees and especially 
workers in smaller plants indeed vote for the right, while their colleagues in larger plants 
support social democracy. We show further that this is caused by stronger effects of 
authoritarianism and restrictive view on immigration in smaller plants. 
The findings have broad implications. The increasing capacity of right-wing parties – 
particularly of new right parties – to get support among the core constituency of social 
democratic parties (working class) generally serves the expansion of the right block (see Bale 
2003). Moreover, the weaker support among working class voters constitutes a powerful 
incentive for social democratic parties to renew their ideological profile in order to appeal to 
middle class voters. At the same time, weaker unions are less able to influence the political 
positioning of their traditional social democratic ally, who has now more leeway for 
programmatic changes. The analysis of parties’ changing social bases undertaken in this 
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article contributes to our understanding of the development of new political coalitions and 
majorities for public policies, and also for industrial relations. 
 
2. When do workers turn right and what is so important about workplace size? 
Political sociology had considered the role of workplace in the study of working class voting 
behaviour. Lipset’s (1981) classic work posited that workers – although left-wing on socio-
economic issues – may vote for right-wing parties if mobilised on non-economic issues, e.g. 
law and order or traditionalism. This particularly concerned workers in non-unionised small 
plants (Lipset 1981: 261-278). British studies of the 1960s and early 1970s detected some 
mechanisms on why workers became “Working Class Tories”. They argued that workers not 
being in a trade union, living in property houses, showing fidelity to their employers and 
identifying with the middle class were more likely to support the Conservative Party in the 
1950s and 1960s (cf. Butler and Rose 1960; Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974; Goldthorpe et al. 
1968; Nordlinger 1967). While this branch of literature on working class vote for the old right 
had been abandoned afterwards, some more recent works have elaborated the role of the 
workplace for social democracy’s success among the working class. 
First, Bartolini (2000: 158-159) demonstrated the crucial impact of the concentration of 
the working class for political mobilisation at the aggregate level. He found workplace size to 
be the most important socio-economic predictor of the left’s electoral strength over one 
century. Second, Pontusson (1995) showed that the employment share of large plants was 
positively correlated with the vote share of social democratic parties. Pontusson (1995) also 
argued that the decreasing share of large plants and the restructuring of the economy towards 
smaller production units has become a structural disadvantage for social democratic parties. 
These studies illustrate that social democratic parties have more difficulties in mobilising the 
workforce in smaller plants and that the mechanisms distinguishing employees of small 
workplaces from those of bigger ones do materialise at the ballots. 
These arguments have however not been further applied in the study of the new right 
since these parties gained ground at the expense of social democracy in many Western 
countries (Kitschelt 2007; Rydgren 2013). In the meantime, many studies have looked at the 
contextual conditions for the new right’s breakthrough such as electoral systems, party 
organisation, party positions, or mainstream party behaviour, while there was some sense of 
consensus that the new right gets disproportionately high support among working class voters 
and the petty bourgeoisie (e.g. Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Kitschelt 2007 Rydgren 2013). 
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A key explanation why workers turn towards the far right has been immigration since workers 
harbour sceptical views on immigration matching the new right’s agenda (e.g. Kitschelt 2007; 
Rydgren 2013). Accordingly, two types of class voting in line with Lipset’s notion of working 
class authoritarianism co-exist in current party politics. One type, where some workers still 
stick to social democracy for economic reasons, and another type, where workers have turned 
right, and base their voting decision on non-economic issues, particularly immigration (e.g. 
Oesch 2013, Oesch and Rennwald, 2010). Despite the classic arguments on the importance of 
workplace size for workers turning right, it is striking that these have often been neglected in 
the study of the new right’s electoral success and its cross-country variation.  
Consequently, Kitschelt’s (2013) discussion of the analyses in Rydgren’s volume 
(2013) proposed to incorporate further factors such as occupational experiences, workplace 
characteristics or the mediating roles of unions and churches to get a more elaborated 
understanding of new right vote and its class base.3 The same goes for the more recent revival 
of “working class Toryism” in some countries where bourgeois parties compete at eye level 
with social democracy among workers. In light of the above, the next section establishes the 
theoretical microfoundation of the relationship between workplace size, attitudes and right-
wing voting. 
 
3. Workplace size, political attitudes, and voting behaviour  
Arguing that the microfoundation of the link between workplace size and (non-)socialist vote 
have never been fully spelled out, Pontusson (1995: 499-503) proposed three mutually 
reinforcing causal mechanisms to link workplace size to social democracy’s strength. The first 
relates to worker consciousness which is supposed to be more easily developed in larger 
plants. Pontusson emphasises two specific elements of large production units: the production 
is more capital-intensive and technologically interdependent than in small plants and the 
relations between employees are more impersonal. Conflicts of interest between workers and 
employers are therefore more transparent. The second relates to the costs of collective 
organisation which are lower in large production units. Economies of scale make union 
mobilisation in large plants more effective. The third one relates to the relative homogeneity 
of workers interests, which is likely higher in large plants. 
These mechanisms can be linked to the discussion in the ER/IR literature on whether 
small firms are characterised by social harmony between employers and employees and larger 
ones by more antagonistic industrial relations (e.g. Goss 1988; Ingham 1970; Marlow & 
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Patton 1993; Moule 1998; Ram and Edwards 2003; cf. Blackburn 2005 for a review of the 
literature since 1970). While we are not able to solve this controversy, we outline the major 
arguments that account for the attitudinal linkage between small workplaces and right-wing 
vote choice. 
As to the first mechanism, Ingham (1970) had argued that labour in smaller workplaces 
has a stronger identification with the employer/owner, while it has a more economic and 
materialist orientation towards work in larger workplaces. Later, Stephenson et al. (1983) 
showed that job satisfaction was higher in smaller firms and decreasing with size of the 
organisation. Moreover, higher job satisfaction led to a better image of the 
owner/management among the workforce (Stephenson et al. 1983: 38). These two early 
studies thus point towards less class consciousness and more harmonious relations in smaller 
businesses. Disputing this claim, Goss (1988) argued that smaller workplaces are not 
necessarily characterised by more harmonious industrial relations. In contrast, employees in 
smaller workplaces have simply an instrumental or pragmatic interest in the company’s 
survival and their job security given the smaller capital base. They therefore co-operate and 
comply with the employer’s demands (see also Marlow & Patton 1993: 60). This means that 
diverging interests and employer-employee conflicts are not per se less present in small firms, 
but can be more effectively neutralised by employers (Goss 1988: 116). Either way, we have 
good reasons to argue that larger workplaces foster more class-conscious workers in contrast 
to smaller workplaces where less conflictive industrial relations prevail. This underpins 
Lipset’s and Pontusson’s macro-sociological link between workplace size and vote choice for 
social democratic or right-wing parties. 
The second mechanism points to the role of unions. Plant size is important for and 
positively correlated with unionisation because workers in large plants are more likely to see 
their employers as adversaries and therefore join unions (e.g. Bryson et al. 2004; Bryson and 
Gomez 2005; Oesch 2006: 172; Pontusson 1995, 2013: 5). Similarly, economies of scale 
make union mobilisation in large plants more effective because recruitment costs per worker 
are lower in larger enterprises (Pontusson 1995: 500). In contrast, workers in smaller 
companies harbour more sceptical and contradictory attitudes towards trade unions since they 
regard trade unions to neglect the interests of the workforce in smaller businesses (Goss 1988: 
123ff). Accordingly, involvement of trade unions in the small businesses’ work routines are 
regarded as threat for their survival by both the employer and employees since the more 
bureaucratic and standardised routines that trade unions have implemented in larger plants 
cannot necessarily be adopted in smaller ones. Moreover, industrial action appears less in 
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smaller establishments since the workforce is aware of the risk of closure given the smaller 
capital base (Goss 1988: 123ff; Marlow & Patton 1993: 62). Weaker unionisation in smaller 
establishments implies lower saliency of issues related to industrial conflict and other 
economic matters such as state intervention or redistribution. 
As to the political implications of workplace size and unionisation, Kitschelt (2013: 
234) posited that unions dampen the workers’ authoritarianism since union elites typically 
hold more liberal views on non-economic issues and do communicate these to their fellow 
members. Unions are therefore an important mediator in the relationship between workplace 
size, political attitudes and vote choice. Consequently, we expect that plant size affects the 
attitudes towards unions and state intervention. 
Finally, the third mechanism points to the number of employees performing similar 
tasks or having some proximity in the type of work done. This increases the homogeneity of 
labour interests as well as the salience of these interests (Pontusson 1995: 499). Accordingly, 
Stephenson et al. (1983) argued and demonstrated that there are less stereotyped and negative 
views of the ‘other’ in smaller firms, while relationships in larger firms are more antagonistic 
and stereotyped. This difference is caused by the more frequent interpersonal relationships 
between people of different statuses in smaller workplaces and the division of labour in larger 
firms which increases within-group identification of people of similar occupational status. 
This should also foster more positive attitudes towards immigrant colleagues since these are 
of similar status in large firms and likely share the economic interests of their fellow 
colleagues given the daily interaction (e.g. Pettigrew 1998). With larger workplace size, the 
opinions about the alleged opponent become also more standardised and more distinct 
attitudes towards industrial relations develop (Stephenson et al. 1983: 39). In this regard, 
Moule (1998: 652) emphasised the importance of informal negotiation in small plants that 
tends to produce less collective consciousness and resistance among the workers given the 
more individualised and atomised personal relations. 
The arguments from the ER/IR literature provide a more nuanced base for Lipset’s 
argument that workers in smaller establishments have a higher propensity to vote for right-
wing parties than their natural social democratic ally. Accordingly, we argue that fewer 
antagonisms in smaller workplaces strengthen the effects of authoritarianism to the benefit of 
right-wing parties. Authoritarianism is here understood as unquestioned obedience to 
authority and customs (see Kitschelt 2007: 1179). In contrast, the higher importance of 
economic preferences among workers in larger plants and their reinforcement through 
stronger unionisation benefits social democratic parties vis-à-vis their 
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conservative/liberal/Christian democratic competitors. We add that workers are more 
confronted with immigrant colleagues of similar status in larger firms. This intragroup contact 
with immigrant colleagues reduces the scepticism towards immigration to the disadvantage of 
the new right party in larger firms since the perceived conflict with the owner/management is 
of higher relative importance. In contrast, the less frequent contact with foreign colleagues 
and the dampened industrial conflict in smaller firms should benefit the new right vis-à-vis 
social democracy. This is a functionally equivalent explanation for new right support which 
was not thoroughly conceptualised by Lipset’s (1981), who implicitly focused on mainstream 
right parties. 
Many arguments on workplace size had been initially developed for the manufacturing 
sector which typically included large plants. However, we do not see any reason why such 
arguments could not apply to all wage-earners. This is why the hypotheses on the political 
effects of plant size are developed for all employees. At the same time, we expect that 
workplace size has stronger effects for production workers. 
 
We derive five testable hypotheses from our literature review: 
 
H1: Employees in larger workplaces harbour more positive attitudes towards unions 
and state intervention since they perceive stronger antagonisms at the workplace 
H2: Authoritarianism and scepticism towards immigration is stronger in smaller 
workplaces with less manifest workplace antagonisms 
H3: Employees in larger workplaces are more likely to support social democratic 
parties relative to mainstream right and new right parties 
H4: The effect of workplace size on voting choice is larger for production workers than 
for other classes 
H5: The right vote choice of employees and production workers in small workplaces is 
explained by stronger effects of authoritarianism and scepticism towards immigration 
conditioned by unionisation 
 
4. Data and Methods 
We use the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002-2010) to test our arguments that workplace 
size affects the attitudes and voting behaviour of employees and workers.4 The ESS provides 
the best data for our purpose since it contains the ISCO88 codes to construct Oesch’s (2006, 
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2008) class scheme, the respondent’s workplace size and a battery of other structural 
variables. We use 16 countries that have established a lasting democratic tradition and 
experienced the challenge of deindustrialisation since the 1970s, a period in which the first 
new right parties made their breakthrough.5 
In all analyses we obtained workplace size through the item: “Including yourself, about 
how many people are/were employed at the place where you usually work/worked?”. This is 
an ordinal variable distinguishing five categories “under 10”, “10-24”, “25-99”, “100-499”, 
and “500 or more”. This is the best operationalisation of workplace size in comparative 
datasets, although the exact number of employees or an interval coding would be preferable 
for our purpose (see Bryson et al. 2004 for a similar operationalisation). To examine whether 
the effect of workplace size on voting choice is larger for production workers than for other 
classes we interacted the production worker dummy with workplace size. 
We apply multilevel linear and logistic regression models because we have variation at 
the micro-level and macro-level and because the respondents in ESS are nested within 
countries (or election years) that differ considerably in their industry structure. Multilevel 
models are adequate for analysing hierarchical or nested data to provide accurate estimates of 
standard errors and taking intra-class correlations into account (e.g. Rabe-Hesketh and 
Skrondal 2012). We included a random intercept at the country level and a random coefficient 
for plant size at the country level. In case of the multilevel logit models, our rationale is to 
account for country-specific idiosyncrasies in the strength of bourgeois and new right parties 
by allowing the constant to vary across countries (our random intercept) and to control for 
country-specific idiosyncrasies of the plant size effect by estimating its variance across 
countries (our random coefficient for plant size). We do not introduce a covariance between 
the random intercept and the random coefficient since these covariances remained 
insignificant in further model specifications. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we use the ESS’ first round and apply a 
multilevel linear regression model. Here we include the independent variables of interest 
stepwise to tap into the causal relationship between workplace size and political attitudes. The 
rationale is to show that small workplaces have less antagonistic relations between employers 
and employees and are also less unionised which leads their employees to develop more 
economically and culturally right-wing attitudes. We use attitudes towards trade unions and 
state intervention to capture economic attitudes and indices for authoritarianism and attitudes 
towards immigration to capture cultural attitudes.6 The two economic items ask “The less that 
government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for [country]” and “Employees need 
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strong trade unions to protect their working conditions and wages” on a scale from ‘1 Agree 
strongly’ to ‘5 Disagree strongly’. 
Our analysis here is limited to the ESS’ first round since this rotating module consists of 
an item that captures workplace antagonisms: “During the last 12 months, how satisfied or 
dissatisfied have you generally been with the way things have been handled in your work or 
workplace?” This item is an important mediator variable of the workplace size effect and 
measured on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘0 Extremely dissatisfied’ to ‘10 Extremely 
satisfied’. While this item does not explicitly ask respondents about relationships between the 
management and the workforce, it is the best available item on workplace antagonisms in 
recent cross-national surveys given that we need data that consist of both an item on 
workplace antagonism and workplace size. These two variables are only jointly available in 
the ESS’ first round restricting the selection of further explanatory or control variables. 
Particularly, a variable that explicitly refers to employers and employees would be desirable. 
The second important mediator variable in this first step is union membership at the 
individual level, respectively union presence at the respondents’ workplace. According to the 
theoretical arguments made above, unionisation is an important mediator of the effect of plant 
size on political attitudes. The same goes for the presence of immigrant colleagues at the 
respondent’s workplace which is expected to dampen sceptical attitudes towards immigration. 
We therefore expect that the inclusion of our measures of workplace antagonism, union 
presence, and immigrant colleagues reduces and explains the workplace size effect. 
Another main independent variable is class. We employ Oesch’s class scheme in its 
eight class version to distinguish classes according to their work logic in post-industrial labour 
markets (Oesch 2006, 2008). Oesch’s class scheme accounts for the tertiarisation of 
employment structure, welfare state expansion, occupational upskilling and the increasing 
heterogeneity of middle class professions. These are crucial factors for the formation of 
political preferences and vote choice for distinct party families (Kitschelt 1994: 17; Oesch 
2006: 61-64; Oesch 2008: 336). We focus particularly on production workers who had been 
social democracy’s traditional core constituency, but increasingly been the backbone of the 
new right and a new target group for some old right parties (Kitschelt 2007; Oesch 2008). 
Further controls at the individual level are age (in years), gender, and education. 
Education is an important predictor in the vote choice for new right parties and we therefore 
inspect whether the effects of workplace size are caused by the lower education of the labour 
force in smaller workplaces. This is a likely effect since larger workplaces are typically more 
capital-/skill-intensive which requires a better educated workforce. We cannot control for 
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public-private occupations since this variable is lacking in the early rounds of the ESS. This 
makes it impossible to include public-private occupations in our first step of the analysis, and 
would to lead to the loss of 39058 observations out of our 58782 observations in our second 
step, where we analyse party choice. 
The second step of our analysis examines whether the workforce in small workplaces 
prefers the old and new right to social democracy. Our dependent variable here is party 
choice, where the respondents were asked which party they voted for in the last national 
election. We focus on the contrast of social democratic party versus new right party and social 
democratic party versus the largest old right party, respectively. These parties are the main 
contenders among production workers and where the workplace size effect should materialise. 
We therefore distinguished these three party families (see Table A1 in the appendix for the 
classification of the respective parties).7 We again use a stepwise model building to show first 
that employees in small workplaces turn to right-wing parties. We then include the interaction 
production worker*workplace size to test whether production workers in small plants 
particularly vote for the right. Afterwards we control for union membership, authoritarianism, 
attitudes towards immigrants and finally introduce three-way interactions union 
membership*workplace size*cultural attitudes. The latter inspects whether the effect of right-
wing attitudes on vote choice is strongest among workers in smaller workplaces and 
moderated through union membership. 
 
5. Analysis  
Workplace size and political attitudes 
We first present the analysis that taps into the mechanisms of working in a small plant and 
having right-wing attitudes. Table 1 presents the results of the multilevel linear regression 
models with the four dependent variables. Models 1-3 inspect our claim that labour in smaller 
workplaces harbours more sceptical views towards unions. The first model shows that 
working at a smaller workplace is indeed significantly connected with more negative 
evaluations of trade unions. The larger their workplace, the more respondents agree with the 
statement that employees need strong trade unions (Hypothesis 1). Model 2 and 3 demonstrate 
that this effect is explained by the less antagonistic relationships in smaller workplaces and 
the stronger organisation at larger workplaces. The more satisfied wage-earners are, the less 
they perceive a need for trade unions and this is a particular phenomenon at smaller 
workplaces (see Table A2). Similarly, the more organised the labour force is, the more it 
12 
 
regards unions as necessary, and this goes for both measures of trade union presence (Model 2 
and 3). 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 A similar but weaker relationship between workplace size and attitudes towards state 
intervention can be seen in Models 4-6. Model 4 shows a significant positive effect of 
workplace size on support for government intervention, which indicates that workers in 
smaller workplaces harbour more economically conservative attitudes. This effect is again 
mediated by satisfaction with the workplace conditions and especially union 
membership/presence as Models 5 and 6 show. Being a union member or having a trade union 
at the workplace makes respondents more supportive of government intervention. This 
explains the workplace size effect from Model 4 that has now halved and become 
insignificant. The analysis confirms that unions affect the attitudes of the workforce and 
increase the effects of economic issues in larger workplaces where the labour force is less 
satisfied with the working conditions. In contrast, labour in smaller workplaces is less 
supportive of government intervention since it perceives less employee-employer conflicts 
and unions are more weakly organised. 
 The results of Models 1-6 prove our first hypothesis that less antagonisms and weaker 
unionisation in smaller workplaces lead to more sceptical attitudes towards trade unions and 
government intervention, while labour in larger workplace holds more traditional left-wing 
economic attitudes. Moreover, it corroborates our arguments that conflicts are more 
transparent in larger workplaces and effectively channelled by unions. 
 Next, we examine the interrelation between workplace size and cultural attitudes by 
deploying our two indices as dependent variables. Models 7-9 reveal that authoritarianism is 
not directly influenced by workplace size. The non-significant coefficient for authoritarianism 
goes against our Hypothesis 2, but is in line with our descriptive analysis in Table A2 where 
authoritarianism does not differ across workplace size. The effect, however, is indirect since 
the inclusion of satisfaction with working conditions reveals the underlying pattern that 
connects workplace size to authoritarianism. Model 8 shows that being satisfied with the 
working conditions is associated with more authoritarian viewpoints. Since the workforce in 
smaller workplaces is more satisfied with the working conditions, we have found the 
attitudinal link in the relationship between plant size and working class authoritarianism that 
Lipset (1981) had established. This is confirmed when interacting our antagonism measure 
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with workplace size. The constitutive term for antagonism – now capturing its effect for small 
firms – doubles from 0.33 to 0.60. The interaction is significant and of negative sign which 
means that the effect of being satisfied with the working conditions on being more 
authoritarian decreases with plant size. This is an indirect proof that cultural issues have 
stronger effects in smaller workplaces, while economic issues have stronger effects in larger 
workplaces. The stronger perceptions of antagonisms among the workforce of larger 
establishments dampen the effect of authoritarianism. 
 A similar pattern of mediation is visible if we use attitudes towards immigration as last 
dependent variable in Models 10-12. Model 10 reveals significantly more liberal views on 
immigration in larger workplaces first. This is explained by the more frequent contact with 
immigrants in Model 11 since the workplace size effect washes completely out after 
controlling for this variable. Moreover, the results of Model 12 indicate that smaller 
workplaces without immigrants produce outright scepticism towards immigrants, while the 
presence of foreign colleagues leads to more liberal attitudes. The interaction 
workplace*immigrant colleagues is significant and negative which indicates that the effect of 
having foreign colleagues on liberal views towards immigrants decreases with plant size. 
Furthermore, the constitutive term for immigrant colleagues – now measuring the effect in 
small workplaces only – has increased to 9.36 in M12. These results suggest that cultural 
effects are stronger in small plants and provide first evidence for Hypothesis 5.  
 Finally, we briefly comment on the control variables in these analyses. The class 
variable yields that production workers are most authoritarian and most sceptical towards 
immigration and government intervention. Similar patterns exist for office clerks and service 
workers. The reference category socio-cultural specialist is usually the most left-wing class on 
all four items and clearly favours state intervention and immigration. Males are less 
authoritarian and sceptical towards immigration, but also less in favour of trade unions and 
government intervention. Since men normally harbour more right-wing attitudes in electoral 
research, one should consider that we controlled for a couple of other predictors that are 
connected to authoritarianism and sceptical attitudes towards immigration. Age is positive 
related to being more authoritarian and restrictive on immigration while its effect on 
economic attitudes is very modest. Higher and especially tertiary education is associated with 
less authoritarianism, more liberal views on immigration, more support for state intervention, 
but also a negative viewpoint on trade unions compared to the reference category less than 
upper secondary education. 
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Workplace size and vote choice 
Having established the mechanisms of workplace size and political attitudes, we now inspect 
whether employees and workers of small workplaces prefer the old and new right to social 
democracy and whether this can be explained by their more right-wing attitudes which we 
analysed above. We restrict this analysis to authoritarianism, immigration attitudes and union 
membership as mediators since the cumulative data set does not include workplace 
antagonisms and attitudes towards trade union or government intervention (which is only 
available in the ESS I). 
Table 2 presents the results of the multilevel models for the effect of the workplace size 
on vote choice with social democratic parties as reference category.8 First, we run a simple 
multilevel logit model with class, workplace size, age, gender, and education (Model 1) to 
inspect whether employees of small workplaces turn towards the right and to which extent the 
party families differ in their voter base. Model 1 yields that production workers – together 
with two employer categories – are the backbone of the new right’s electoral support. Their 
coefficients are highly significant and have the expected sign. In contrast to the new right, the 
old right does not outperform the social democrats among production workers since the 
coefficient is negative and significant. This is not surprising as production workers have only 
recently become an explicit target group for some mainstream bourgeois parties. 
Crucially for our argument, the workplace size variable yields a significant negative 
effect on the choice to prefer old and new right parties to social democratic ones. The larger 
their workplace, the less do workers vote for right-wing parties vis-à-vis social democratic 
parties. Notably, the effect of the workplace size for mainstream bourgeois parties is 
somewhat stronger than for the new right. This provides evidence for our third hypothesis that 
workplace size affects vote decisions since employees of larger plants favour social 
democratic parties, while their colleagues in small-sized plants favour both the new and old 
right. The three demographic controls correspond to previous findings from electoral research. 
Younger respondents prefer the new right to social democrats, while older respondents have a 
tendency to prefer the old right. Males do significantly prefer both right party families to 
social democrats and particularly the new right. Voters with tertiary education prefer social 
democracy over the new right, whereas bourgeois parties perform significantly better among 
voters with higher (more than upper secondary) education compared to social democracy. 
Since the results for these three controls stay virtually the same for all models examined, we 
do not comment on them in the following models. 
 
15 
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Model 2 tests our fourth hypothesis that the plant size effect is particularly strong 
among production workers by introducing the interaction production worker*workplace size.9 
The constitutive terms for the respective variables yield first that the effect for production 
workers (now only those in small workplaces) on the vote for the new right has increased 
compared to previous models. Similarly, the coefficient contrasting mainstream bourgeois 
parties and social democrats among production workers has changed sign, but remains 
significant. Accordingly, production workers in smaller workplaces significantly prefer the 
old right over social democratic parties. The constitutive term for workplace size (now for all 
classes except production workers) has decreased and become insignificant in case of the new 
right. The effect of the workplace size shown in Model 1 is therefore largely attributable to 
productions workers as we stated in Hypothesis 4. 
Moreover, the interactions production worker*workplace size in Model 2 are both 
negative and significant at conventional levels which means that the support for the new and 
old right vis-à-vis social democracy among production workers declines as workplace size 
increases. The interaction effects are also stronger than the constitutive terms for workplace 
size from the same model and the coefficients for workplace size from Model 1. This provides 
further evidence for Hypothesis 4 that establishment size matters especially for the vote 
choice of production workers. 
Next, Model 3 controls whether the effects of the workplace size are caused by 
unionisation – an important mediator in our first step of the analysis. As expected, union 
members significantly prefer social democratic parties to new and old right parties. Crucially, 
controlling for union membership diminishes the effects of workplace size. When compared 
to Model 1, the constitutive term for plant size in Model 3 washes almost completely out for 
the new right and halves in size for the old right. The constitutive term for the vote choice of 
production workers for the old right in Model 3 also losses strength and significance 
compared to Model 2. The effects of the workplace size that we found in Models 1 and 2 are 
therefore partly attributable to union membership as argued in the literature (e.g. Oesch 2006; 
Pontusson 1995). However, the interaction production worker*workplace size reduces only 
mildly and stays significant after we control for union membership in Model 3. This means 
that workplace size has still an independent effect on voting among production workers which 
confirms our fourth hypothesis once more even when we control for unionisation. 
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A next step was to include indices for authoritarianism and attitudes towards 
immigration (Model 4). This tests our fifth hypothesis that right-wing support in smaller 
workplaces can be explained by stronger effects of authoritarianism and immigration – 
conditioned by unionisation. To inspect the common explanations for the vote choice for 
these two party families and to save space, we use our immigration index in Model 4 for the 
new right and the index of authoritarianism in Model 4 for the old right as additional 
independent variables.  
The respective coefficients of Model 4 show that particularly the vote choice of 
production workers in small plants for the new right can be explained by their right-wing 
attitudes. The constitutive term for production workers (those in small plants) in Model 4 
reduces for both right-wing parties after introducing our two indices of right-wing cultural 
attitudes when compared to the respective coefficients in Model 3. The coefficients for the 
two indices confirm our expectations further since being more authoritarian and restrictive 
towards immigration significantly benefits both types of right-wing parties.10 
In contrast, the interaction terms for production workers and workplace size remain 
almost unchanged and still significant. This means that workers in smaller plants favour both 
right-wing party families in contrast to social democratic parties even if we control for right-
wing attitudes. On the other hand, the larger the plant of a production worker, the more likely 
(s)he supports social democratic parties. 
To inspect the moderating role of unions, we finally interacted union membership with 
plant size and the two indices. We thus examine whether authoritarianism and attitudes 
towards immigration have stronger effects on vote choice in smaller plants and what role 
unions play for the translation of right-wing attitudes into vote choices. To save space and 
keep the analysis and figures parsimonious, we decided to contrast social democratic parties 
with both right-wing party families and report the findings in Model 5. Since three-way 
interactions (and their significance) from multilevel logit models are not easily interpretable, 
we calculated the predicted probabilities for voting a social democratic party across the range 
of the two indices for three illustrative conditions. 
Figure 1 shows that unions play a strong role in moderating the effect of 
authoritarianism on vote choice for right-wing versus social democratic parties and 
demonstrates that unionisation accounts for a large part of the plant size effect. The slopes in 
Figure 1 yield the strongest effects of authoritarianism on right-wing vote choice among non-
unionised workers in smaller plants, while the effects of authoritarianism are weaker among 
union members in both very small and very large plants. All three types of workers support 
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social democracy with a probability of around 70 per cent if they harbour libertarian attitudes 
(left-hand side of Figure 1). Moving towards more authoritarianism values affects right-wing 
vote choice most effectively among non-unionised workers in small plants. Their differences 
to unionised workers become significant when our index exceeds values of 55, a value where 
the support for social democracy also drops below 50 percent. In contrast, the probability of 
voting social democracy stays always above 50 percent among unionised workers (in both 
small and large firms), even if they harbour very authoritarian values (right-hand side of 
Figure 1). This result confirms that unions dampen working class authoritarianism to the 
benefit of social democratic parties. Authoritarianism works most effectively in favour of 
right-wing parties among non-union members who are most common in small firms. In this 
respect, we found evidence that the weaker unionisation in smaller plants accounts for a 
considerable part of the workplace effect and thus mutes the strength of cultural issues 
(Hypothesis 5). 
 
[FIGURE 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Similar but somewhat weaker and not always significant patterns can be observed for 
immigration (Figure 2). Union membership moderates the effects of attitudes towards 
immigration on vote choice and accounts for a substantial part of the workplace size effect. 
First, when holding the most restrictive attitudes (left-hand side of Figure 2), non-unionised 
workers in small plants (black line) are least likely to support social democracy and this is 
significantly different to unionised workers in larger plants (blue line). This difference 
remains significant until the scale reaches 70 (the scale runs from ‘0 most skeptical’ to ‘100 
most liberal’). This indicates stronger effects of immigration on vote choice in small 
businesses with weaker unionisation. Second, the slope for unionised workers in small firms 
(red line) across the index for immigration deserves attention. Unionised workers in small 
firms with very restrictive attitudes have a similar probability in supporting social democracy 
vis-à-vis right-wing parties compared to their non-unionised colleagues (left-hand side of 
Figure 2). However, the farther we move towards liberal attitudes, the stronger the tendency 
of unionised workers in small companies to support social democracy compared to their non-
unionised colleagues. Unionised workers in small companies approach the voting behaviour 
of union members in large firms if the index exceeds 50. Restrictive attitudes on immigration 
therefore turn most effectively into right-wing vote choice among non-unionised workers of 
small firms. In contrast, our results demonstrate that unions are a decisive force to mute the 
18 
 
effects of immigration to the benefit of social democracy. Accordingly, the patterns in Figure 
2 complement our evidence for Hypothesis 5 as the stronger effects of cultural issues on vote 
choice in smaller firms are conditioned (and thus explained) by unionisation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article examined the role of workplace size for political attitudes and the support of 
working class voters for new and old right parties vis-à-vis social democratic parties. While 
the strength of the new right among production workers is well-documented (Kitschelt 2007), 
there is still limited knowledge on which type of working class voters turns right and thus still 
some unexplained cross-country variation in the support of working class voters for the new 
right. The same goes for some mainstream right-wing parties that in some countries 
successfully broadened their voter base by competing for working class voters. We argued 
that the success of old and new right parties is contingent on the workplace size as smaller 
plants produce less antagonistic relationships between employers and employees, whereas 
larger plants have more adversary relationships, while collective mobilisation through unions 
is easier here. Drawing on arguments from classical political sociology and ER/IR scholarship 
on the role of the workplace for working class support for the right, we expected that 
workplace size affects the vote of workers for the old and new right compared to their 
traditional ally, the social democrats. 
As summarised in Table 3, our hypotheses at the micro-level were largely confirmed 
as employees in smaller workplaces with less employer-employee antagonisms harboured 
more right-wing attitudes and preferred the two right-wing party families to social democratic 
parties, while social democrats enjoy increasing support among labour as plant size grows. 
Furthermore, this effect is particularly virulent among production workers and the effects of 
right-wing attitudes are stronger among the labour force in smaller workshops and weaker in 
larger plants. This is explained by the stronger unionisation in larger plants which reduces the 
effects of authoritarianism and immigration on voting for right-wing parties. In this respect, 
the weaker antagonism found in smaller workplaces hampers unionisation and makes vote 
choices based on cultural issues more likely, which confirms Kitschelt’s (2013: 234) claim. 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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The article has focused on plant size, a variable that has been assumed to have 
important effects for the relationships between workers and employers and for collective 
action. By focusing on this variable, we investigated how the very basic structure of a 
workplace affects political attitudes and matters for voting choice. In an effort of elucidating 
the microfoundations of plant size effect, our analysis has shown the decisive role played by 
unionisation which reduced the plant size effect in various models. However, this should not 
be a reason for completely dismissing the influence of plant size. One can argue that plant size 
is the first variable to consider in a causal path, since it is antecedent to unionisation. Yet, 
more complex interactions between plant size and unionisation are also possible. Unionisation 
could precede plant size, when for example plant restructuring occurs because the workforce 
is unionized. Without having completely disentangled these effects, our findings have some 
important implications for the importance of plant size and unions in electoral behaviour.  
First, the article sheds light on the difficulties and opportunities for political parties to 
gain support among workers in contexts where large factories do no longer dominate the 
industrial landscape. Unionised workers are more likely to support social democratic parties 
than mainstream right-wing parties or new right parties. Consequently, in times of weaker 
unionisation, social democratic parties are less able to mobilise their historical core 
constituency, i.e. the working class. The presence of small plants and the corresponding low 
level of unionisation will therefore permit right-wing parties to gain ground inside the 
working class with a culture based appeal. Without the presence of unions who insure the 
importance of economic issues, workers in smaller plants are more likely to consider cultural 
issues more important for their vote choice. De-unionisation might be well a decisive element 
for the phenomena of electoral dealignment and realignment that many Western European 
countries have faced since the 1970s.  
Second, and in a comparative perspective, we believe that our findings contribute to 
the understanding of favourable context conditions for the new right and its emergence. If 
workplace size has an effect on workers’ political attitudes and their voting behaviour, then it 
follows that countries with an industry structure characterised by a high share of small and 
medium-sized plants provide a favourable context for the establishment and electoral 
performance of the new right. In contrast, countries with the dominance of big 
companies/workplaces constitute a more difficult terrain for the new right. 
Third, further analysis should dig deeper in the mechanisms and should add both 
dynamic aspects and aggregate level data on the industry structure. Analysing longer time 
spans with data of sufficient quality would also permit to analyse the effects of 
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deindustrialisation and industrial restructuring on the relationship between class, workplace 
size, unionisation and vote choice over time. Moreover, combining high quality data on the 
industry structure with individual level survey data would shed more light on contextual 
factors for the competition between mainstream bourgeois, social democratic, and far right 
parties. Similarly, it would add further evidence on the relationship between workplace size 
and right vote that we tried to establish in this paper. 
   
21 
 
 
                                                          
1 We use the term old right to denote mainstream liberal, conservative and in some countries Christian 
democratic parties. We use the term new right to denote parties that the literature typically labels as extreme 
right, populist right or radical right. 
2 We use the terms plant, workplace and workshop interchangeably. 
3 When unionisation has been taken into account, this has not lead to clear findings. For example, Bornschier 
and Kriesi (2013) show that skilled unionised workers are less likely to vote for the new right, but not unionised 
routine operatives, while Oesch (2008) finds a negative but weak impact of union membership on voting for 
new right parties. 
4 The European Social Survey can be accessed at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/, where further 
material for documentation is available. 
5 We use data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
6 We created the index for authoritarian attitudes using the variables “impsafe”, “ipfrule”, “ipstrgv”, “ipbhprp”, 
and “imptrad” from the item battery on traditionalism/authoritarianism in the European Social Survey. The 
index goes from 0 (most libertarian) to 100 (most authoritarian) with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.7231. The index 
on immigration was created from the item battery on attitudes towards immigration/immigrants in each ESS-
round and contains six variables (“imbgeco”, “imueclt”, “imwbcnt”, “imsmetn”, “imdfetn” and “impcntr”). The 
index goes from 0 (most restrictive) to 100 (most liberal) with a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.8257. See the online 
appendix for further information. 
7 If parties form electoral cartels alliances, they are grouped in the same family, e.g. the Flemish Labour and 
Walloon Socialist Parties are grouped as Belgian Social Democrats. 
8 We performed various robustness and sensitivity tests of our models such running the same models with 
election years as clusters. Some of these exemplary models appear in the online appendix of this article. 
9 We are aware that logit coefficients from different models are not fully comparable (Mood 2010). We 
therefore inspected the predicted probabilities of all models run and also ran linear probability models as 
alternative specification suggested by Mood (2010: 78f). These yield similar patterns as our logit coefficients 
and we therefore stick to the presentation of the logits in Table 2 (see Figure A1 in the online appendix for a 
visual inspection of Model 3 for the bourgeois parties). 
10 Replacing the indices with each other in the models yields a similarly strong and highly significant effect of 
authoritarianism to prefer the new right versus social democracy, whereas the effect of immigration to prefer 
the old right is only -0.015 but still highly significant. 
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TABLE 1 
Effects of class, unionisation and workplace size on attitudes towards government intervention, unions, authoritarianism and immigration, 2002 in sixteen Western countries 
 Need for trade unions: higher 
values indicate disagreement 
Government intervention: higher 
values indicate higher support 
Authoritarianism: higher values 
indicate more auth. 
Attitudes towards immigrants, index: 
higher values mean more liberal 
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 M11 M12 
Individual level 
Class (reference category: Socio-cultural specialists) 
Traditional bourgeoisie 0.17 0.03 0.17 -0.24 -0.20 -0.25 5.67 5.57 5.48 -1.44* -1.61* -1.66* 
Technical specialists 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.16*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.17*** 0.27 0.29 0.26 -4.30*** -4.54*** -4.51*** 
Managers 0.40*** 0.30*** 0.34*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 1.02! 1.00! 1.00! -2.62*** -2.72*** -2.69*** 
Petite bourgeoisie 0.31! 0.18 0.28 -0.25 -0.21 -0.25 -2.78 -2.85 -2.94 -4.90*** -4.87*** -4.80*** 
Production workers -0.03 -0.07* -0.07* -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.25*** 3.00*** 3.08*** 3.06*** -8.12*** -8.06*** -8.06*** 
Office clerks 0.17*** 0.10** 0.13*** -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 1.72** 1.74** 1.72** -4.20*** -3.99*** -4.00*** 
Service workers 0.00 -0.06* -0.04 -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.19*** 2.62*** 2.64*** 2.61*** -5.29*** 5.28*** -5.26*** 
   
Male 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.04* -0.04* -0.05* -1.60*** -1.59*** -1.58*** 1.23*** 1.06*** 1.04*** 
Age 0.00 0.00*** 0.00! -0.00* -0.00** -0.00! 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
Education (reference category: less than upper secondary)   
Upper secondary 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.80! -0.76! -0.76! 2.88*** 2.89*** 2.88*** 
Post-secondary 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.19** 0.19** 0.18** -1.53 -1.50 -1.52 4.89*** 4.67*** 4.66*** 
Tertiary 0.25*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** -3.99*** -3.92*** -3.92*** 8.80*** 8.46*** 8.45*** 
   
Union member  -0.45***   0.11***  0.33 0.47 0.47 0.88** 0.78** 0.78** 
Workplace size -0.04*** -0.01* -0.00 0.02** 0.01! 0.01 -0.11 -0.05 0.55! 0.36*** 0.02 0.19! 
Satisfaction with work 
conditions 
 0.02*** 0.02***  -0.01 -0.01!  0.33*** 0.60***    
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Trade union at workplace: 
no 
  0.27***   -0.06**       
Immigrant colleagues: 
several 
          6.88*** 9.36*** 
Interactions   
Workplace 
size*Satisfaction 
        -0.10*    
Workplace size*several 
immigrant colleagues 
           -0.83*** 
Constant 1.89*** 1.81*** 1.28*** 3.34*** 3.36*** 3.49*** 55.06*** 52.79*** 51.07*** 58.08*** 56.20*** 55.83*** 
Random-effect parameters 
at context level 
            
Variance of residual 0.89* 0.85* 0.88* 0.97* 0.97* 0.97* 267.53* 266.96* 266.87* 279.38* 274.61* 274.46* 
Random intercept variance 0.019* 0.029* 0.017* 0.040* 0.038* 0.040* 14.82* 14.88* 14.87* 21.46* 19.88* 19.93* 
             
N 13484(16) 13436(16) 12997(16) 13056(16) 13011(16) 12603(16) 11883(14) 11883(14) 11883(14) 23068(16) 22946(16) 22946(16) 
-2ll -18386.62 -18016.40 -17647.79 -18335.62 -18261.33 -17689.56 -50096.64 -50083.82 -50081.82 -97735.35 -97020.72 -97014.48 
LL-ratio test of rho=0 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Source: Multilevel linear regression models with ESS 2002 data. Notes: ! p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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TABLE 2 
Workplace size and vote choice for new right and old right parties vis-à-vis social democrats, 2002-2010 in sixteen Western countries. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 New right Bourgeois New right Bourgeois New right Bourgeois New right Bourgeois Both right-wing parties 
Individual level For autho-
ritarianism  
For 
immigration 
Class (reference category: Socio-cultural specialists) 
Traditional bourgeoisie 0.86*** 0.82*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 0.81*** 0.74*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.66*** 
Technical specialists 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.38** 0.24*** 0.32** 0.17** 0.22! 0.16** 0.17** 0.13* 
Managers 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 
Petite bourgeoisie 1.14*** 0.82*** 1.19*** 0.87*** 1.08*** 0.74*** 0.95*** 0.77*** 0.76*** 0.64*** 
Production workers 0.76*** -0.12** 1.06*** 0.23** 1.02*** 0.13! 0.71*** 0.12 -0.05 -0.19*** 
Office clerks 0.54*** 0.26*** 0.54*** 0.26*** 0.48*** 0.18*** 0.38*** 0.16** 0.20*** 0.15** 
Service workers 0.66*** -0.09* 0.67*** -0.08! 0.62*** -0.16*** 0.29** -0.18*** -0.08! -0.18*** 
 
Male 0.37*** 0.06* 0.37*** 0.05* 0.42*** 0.09*** 0.49*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
Age -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.02*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00* 
Education (reference category: less than upper secondary) 
Upper secondary -0.01 0.19*** -0.02 0.19*** 0.02 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.27*** 
Post-secondary -0.12 0.19** -0.12 0.19** -0.10 0.21** 0.20 0.23** 0.19** 0.27*** 
Tertiary -0.66*** 0.31*** -0.66*** 0.31*** -0.63*** 0.34*** -0.12 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.41*** 
           
Union member     -0.61*** -0.56*** -0.58*** -0.56*** -0.23 -0.10 
Workplace size -0.07* -0.10*** -0.03 -0.07** -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 -0.05* -0.04 -0.07* 
Authoritarianism        0.01*** 0.01***  
Attitudes towards 
immigration (positive) 
      -0.05***   -0.02*** 
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Interactions 
Production 
worker*Workplace size 
  -0.11** -0.13*** -0.10** -0.12*** -0.11** -0.12***   
Union*Workplace size         0.01 -0.11* 
Union*Cultural attitudes         -0.01! -0.01** 
Cultural attitudes 
*Workplace size 
        -0.00 -0.00 
Union*Workplace size* 
Cultural attitudes 
        0.00 0.00** 
Constant -3.39*** -0.55** -3.48*** -0.63*** -3.28*** -0.38* -0.56 -1.06*** -0.84*** 1.09*** 
Random-effect parameters 
at context level 
          
Variance of workplace 
coefficient 
0.004* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
Random intercept variance 9.74* 0.34* 9.77* 0.33* 9.90* 0.34* 10.11* 0.32* 0.28* 0.33* 
           
N 25158(16) 40952(16) 25158(16) 40952(16) 25117(16) 40859(16) 23287(16) 37635(16) 41077(16) 41402(16) 
-2ll -7757.52 -26586.29 -7752.79 -26565.45 -7653.60 -26285.21 -6374.91 -24158.06 -26562.63 -26310.38 
LL-ratio test of rho=0 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Source: Multilevel logit models with ESS data 2002-2010. Notes: Social democrats are reference category. ! p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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TABLE 3 
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Results 
H1: Employees in larger workplaces harbour more 
positive attitudes towards unions and state 
intervention since they perceive stronger 
antagonisms at the workplace 
Confirmed: especially attitudes towards unions are 
negative in small workplaces (M1-M3, Table 1), 
effects are mediated through workplace 
antagonisms and union presence at workplace 
H2: Authoritarianism and scepticism towards 
immigration is stronger in smaller workplaces with 
less manifest workplace antagonisms 
Partly confirmed: effects for authoritarianism only 
appear after controlling for workplace 
antagonisms (M7-M9, Table 1); effects for 
immigration confirmed (M10, Table 1) and 
explained through contact with immigrants at 
workplace (M11-M12, Table 1) 
H3: Employees in larger workplaces are more likely 
to support social democratic parties relative to 
mainstream right and new right parties 
Confirmed (M1, Table 2) 
H4: The effect of workplace size on voting choice is 
larger for production workers than for other classes 
Confirmed (M2-M3, Table 2) 
H5: The right vote choice of employees and 
production workers in small workplaces is explained 
by stronger effects of authoritarianism and 
scepticism towards immigration conditioned by 
unionisation 
Partly confirmed: authoritarianism and restrictive 
views on immigration benefits right-wing parties 
(M4, Table 2) 
Three-way interactions in M5, Table 2 indicate that 
workers in small workplaces base their vote 
decision more strongly on cultural issues; graphic 
illustration yields clear patterns for 
authoritarianism which benefits right-wing 
parties more strongly among non-union members 
in small firms (Figure 1); weaker but similar 
patterns in Figure 2 for immigration  
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FIGURE 1 
Effect of authoritarianism on social democratic support by plant size and union membership. 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Effect of attitudes towards immigration on social democratic support by plant size and union membership. 
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Appendix 
TABLE A1 
Classification of national parties into party families 
Social democratic SPÖ (Austria), SP-A, PS (Belgium), SD (Denmark), SDP (Finland), PS (France), 
SPD (Germany), Labour (Great Britain, Ireland), DS/La Margherita (Italy), LSAP 
(Luxembourg), PvdA (Netherlands), DNA (Norway), PS (Portugal), PSOE (Spain), 
SAP (Sweden), SPS (Switzerland) 
Old right (largest 
mainstream bourgeois 
party) 
ÖVP (Austria), CVP/CD, PSC/CDH (Belgium), Venstre (Denmark), Centre Party 
(Finland), UMP (France), CDU/CSU (Germany), Conservative Party (Great Britain), 
Fianna Fáil (Ireland), Forza Italia (Italy), CSV (Luxembourg), CDA (Netherlands), 
Høyre (Norway), PSD (Portugal), PP (Spain), Moderaterna (Sweden), FDP 
(Switzerland) 
New right FPÖ (Austria), Vlaams Blok/Belang, FN (Belgium), DF, FrP (Denmark), True Finns 
(Finland), FN, MNR (France), Republikaner, NPD (Germany), BNP, UKIP (Great 
Britain), Alleanza Nationale, Lega Nord (Italy), ADR (Luxembourg), LPF/Leefbaar 
Nederland, PVV, Trots op Nederland (Netherlands), FrP (Norway), Nacional 
Renovador (Portugal), Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden), SVP, Schweizer Demokraten 
(Switzerland) 
Source: Own classification. Note: in the ESS4, the Belgian Christian Democrats also include the N-VA as the 
parties formed an electoral cartel. 
 
 
TABLE A2 
Descriptive statistics of selected variables 
 Satisfaction 
with the way 
things 
handled at 
workplace 
last 12 
months 
 
Mean of 
Variable, 
higher values 
indicate more 
satisfaction 
Respondent is 
currently 
member of 
trade union 
 
Percentage: 
yes 
Trade union 
at workplace 
 
Percentage: 
yes 
Employees 
need strong 
trade 
unions to 
protect 
their 
working 
conditions 
and wages 
 
Percentage: 
Agree 
Do you have 
any 
colleagues at 
work who 
have come 
to live in 
[country] 
from another 
country? 
 
Percentage: 
No, none 
Index of 
authoritarian 
attitudes 
 
Mean, higher 
values 
indicate more 
authoritarian 
attitudes 
Workplace 
size 
      
Under 10 
employees 
6.67 10.1 25.7 67.0 71.6 66.8 
10-24 
employees 
6.21 17.4 43.3 72.7 56.7 66.4 
25-99 
employees 
6.15 24.3 60.3 71.9 46.6 65.9 
100-499 
employees 
5.80 27.4 77.6 75.0 37.9 66.2 
500 or more 5.62 27.7 87.4 74.1 38.9 66.2 
All 6.14 19.2 56.3 71.2 54.8 66.5 
Source: ESS I, 2002 for first four items, ESS I-V for authoritarian attitudes, own calculations, data are weighted. 
